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THE FUTURE OF BAIL IN CALIFORNIA:
ANALYZING SB 10 THROUGH THE PRISM OF
PAST REFORMS
Adam Peterson*
The cash bail system is the cause of numerous injustices. It favors
the rich over the poor, it packs jails to the breaking point, and it forces
those who have yet to be found guilty to sit in jail—often for weeks or
months at a time. In 2018, the California legislature passed SB 10. The
bill purported to abolish cash bail wholesale and replace it with a risk
assessment program. While SB 10 is a step in the right direction, it faces
many obstacles before it accomplishes its goal. This Note examines the
bill in light of past attempts at criminal justice reform, suggests what a
successful SB 10 might look like, and offers a solution for how to get
there.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On the night of November 2, 2015, 18-year-old Daniel Soto went
to McDonald’s with his friends.1 While there, a man attacked him and
his friends with a knife, slicing Daniel from his chest to his stomach.2
Daniel’s friends fought back, and the attacker ran.3 The attacker
eventually found a police officer and reported that Daniel’s group had
accosted him.4 Daniel was arrested and brought to a hospital, where
he was handcuffed to his hospital bed after doctors operated on him.5
He was then charged with felony assault.6 Daniel pleaded “not guilty,”
and a judge set his bail at $30,000.7 Neither Daniel nor his family
could pay, and no bail bondsman offered a payment plan that they
could afford.8 As a result, Daniel stayed in jail for weeks.9 Finally, on
December 17, Daniel had his preliminary hearing, where the same
judge who set his bail found that there was no evidence he committed
the crime and summarily dismissed the case.10 Though he was finally
able to return home, Daniel had missed six weeks of school.11 Having
always been a slow learner, he was unable to catch up and ultimately
dropped out of school.12 This teenager’s life was turned on its head
simply because his family could not afford to bail him out.
Compare Daniel’s story with that of Tiffany Li, a Northern
California real estate heiress who was arrested for a far worse crime—
directing two men to murder the father of her children.13 Despite the
seriousness of the alleged crime and the fact that she had family in
China, indicating that she was a potential flight risk, she was quickly
released from jail because she and her friends were able to raise her

1. Nazish Dholakia, Witness: Falsely Accused and Locked Up in California, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Apr. 11, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/11/witness-falselyaccused-and-locked-california.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Keith Green, Hillsborough Woman Accused of Killing Father of Her Kids Out on Bail,
ABC7 (Apr. 6, 2017), https://abc7news.com/news/bay-area-murder-suspect-released-after-postingbail/1842656.
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$35 million bail.14 The differences between Tiffany and Daniel’s
experiences illustrate the problems associated with cash bail, which
disproportionately burdens the poor.15
The ills of the cash bail system in the United States have been
well-chronicled. Sixty percent of those in jail in America have not
been convicted of any crime; that’s more than 450,000 people sitting
in jail cells either because they cannot afford bail, are flight risks, or
have been deemed a danger to public safety.16 Compared to the rest of
the world, America’s pretrial detention rates are staggering. Despite
having only 4 percent of the world’s population, the United States has
nearly 20 percent of the world’s pretrial jail population.17 These
numbers come with equally staggering costs to American taxpayers.
Taxpayers spend nearly $38 million per day to house inmates in
pretrial detention.18
The effects of pretrial detention on those detained are equally
pernicious. Detainees are pressured to enter guilty pleas so that they
can get out of jail and go home to their families.19 If they don’t, they
are subject to situations like Daniel’s—sitting in jail for weeks (and
sometimes months) on end, away from family, friends, and support.20
Those who choose not to plead guilty may lose jobs, homes, and even
custody of children.21

14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Sam Levin, Wealthy Murder Suspect Freed on Bail as Man Accused of Welfare
Fraud Stuck in Jail, GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/5YHY-23ZS.
16. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS,
JAIL
INMATES
AT
MIDYEAR
2014
4
(2015),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf.; see also ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRETRIAL/REMAND IMPRISONMENT LIST, INST. FOR CRIM. POL’Y RES. (3d ed. 2016),
https://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/
wptril_3rd_edition.pdf (reporting that the number of people in pre-trial/remand imprisonment in
the United States is 467,500).
17. Lorna Collier, Incarceration Nation, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Oct. 2014),
www.apa.org/monitor/2014/10/incarceration (“While the United States has only 5 percent of the
world’s population, it has nearly 25 percent of its prisoners—about 2.2 million people.”).
18. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE: HOW MUCH DOES IT COST? 2 (2017),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileK
ey=c2f50513-2f9d-2719-c990-a1e991a57303&forceDialog=0.
19. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2464, 2492–93 (2004).
20. Dholakia, supra note 1.
21. Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention,
69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 715 (2017).
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The insidious effects of the cash bail system are felt nationwide.22
Certain states, however, exacerbate the problem with overly draconian
bail systems. California is one of those states. California’s detention
rate and median bail are significantly higher than the national
average.23 Although California law mandates that judges analyze a
variety of factors when setting bail, recent studies have shown that
California courts tend to simply use the bail schedule alone, making
the defendant’s personal wealth the sole factor in determining
release.24 This, in part, has led to California’s severe pretrial detention
problem.25 To wit, the nationwide pretrial detention rate for felony
defendants is 32 percent; in California, that number is a staggering 59
percent.26 Rates of pretrial misconduct are higher in California than
they are elsewhere.27 And the median bail in the state is five times
higher than it is in the rest of the country.28
To address the numerous problems of cash bail, Senator Robert
Hertzberg (D-Van Nuys) introduced Senate Bill 10 (“SB 10”) in
December of 2016.29 Initially, this proposal seemed like a step in the
right direction. The bill provided for a broad presumption in favor of
pretrial release, with very narrow exceptions based on public safety.30
However, the version of SB 10 that ultimately passed disappointed
reformers; the previously narrow public safety exceptions had been
expanded, as had both judicial and prosecutorial discretion to detain.
This final version, passed in August 2018, will be subject to the will

22. See Malcolm M. Feeley, How to Think About Criminal Court Reform, 98 B.U. L. REV.
673, 679 (2018).
23. Sonya Tafoya, Pretrial Detention and Jail Capacity in California, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL.
fig. 3 (July 2015), https://perma.cc/E2U9-AEME.
24. See generally Christine S. Scott-Hayward & Sarah Ottone, Punishing Poverty:
California’s Unconstitutional Bail System, STAN. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 2018),
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/punishing-poverty/ (finding that judges in California
rarely deviate from the bail schedule).
25. Id. at 172–73.
26. Tafoya, supra note 23.
27. SONYA TAFOYA ET AL., PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL., PRETRIAL RELEASE IN CALIFORNIA 5
(2017), https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_0517STR.pdf.
28. It’s Time to Do Away with California’s Cash Bail System, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 7,
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/editorials/article143174454.html.
29. S.B. 10, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
30. See Bail: Pretrial Release: Hearing on S.B. 10 Before the S. Comm. on Pub. Safety, 2018
Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
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of California voters, who will vote on whether the law takes effect in
November 2020.31
Though reformers had high hopes for SB 10, California’s history
of criminal justice reform is littered with well-intentioned ideas that
either failed outright or have unforeseen deleterious effects.32 Despite
this troubled past, reformers continue to push for the same movements,
ignoring the lessons of history.33 Specifically, legislators and
reformers have historically ignored that the implementation of reform
measures is reliant on actors, such as judges and prosecutors, within
the criminal justice system. These actors tend to have great incentive
to maintain the status quo—or, in the face of pressure to initiate
reform, perhaps even become more restrictive. Judges must cater to an
electorate that might vote them out of office should they release an
arrestee who then goes on to commit a major crime. Prosecutors, as
elected officials, share a similar burden. Should judges be seen as
overly forgiving of arrestees, they risk prosecutors exercising
peremptory challenges, keeping lenient judges from ever seeing
certain types of cases.34 By contrast, there is almost no incentive to
release arrestees. After all, the costs and injustices of
overincarceration do not redound directly to judges or prosecutors—
the costs of being lenient do.
This Note seeks to: (1) examine the ultimate influence that
criminal justice actors might wield on SB 10; and (2) how to expect
and account for it. Specifically, it will examine trends, both modern
and historical, that indicate reformers consistently fail to consider the
dramatic effect criminal justice actors have on reforms. By seeking to
understand the motivations of these parties, this Note attempts to set a
reasonable expectation for what SB 10’s success might look like and
provide a roadmap for how to get there.
31. Michael McGough, The Fate of California’s Cash Bail Industry Will Now Be Decided on
the
2020
Ballot,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Jan. 17,
2019,
11:58
AM),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/article224682595.html.
32. Sacramento Bee & ProPublica, A Brief History of California’s Epic Journey Toward
Prison Reform, PAC. STANDARD (May 29, 2019), www.psmag.com/social-justice/a-brief-historyof-california-prison-reform.
33. Id.
34. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West 2011); see also SACRAMENTO CTY. PUB. L.
LIBR., PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE OF A JUDGE: REMOVE THE JUDGE FROM YOUR CASE,
https://saclaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sbs-peremptory-challenge-of-a-judge.pdf (“If . . . you
believe you cannot get a fair and impartial hearing or trial from the judge . . . assigned to your case,
California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) § 170.6 gives you the right to disqualify him or her
without having to show a reason.”).
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Part II analyzes the history of cash bail and bail reform
movements throughout both United States and California history. It
also examines the introduction and development of SB 10. Part III
seeks to answer why past reforms have so often failed and determine
how reformers can learn from past failures. Part IV closely analyzes
how judicial system actors have affected reforms throughout
California’s history and how reformers now can expect courtroom
players to exercise their discretion with regards to SB 10. Part V looks
at current bail reform efforts and determines that judges and
prosecutors—influenced by the factors described in Part IV—tend to
use their discretionary powers to ultimately cancel out the intended
effects of those reforms. Part VI asks what reformers can do in
California to ensure that SB 10 does not fail in similar ways, and also
seeks to determine what a successful SB 10 might look like. Part VII
concludes that, while SB 10 might not achieve all the goals that its
high-minded creators envisioned, it is not doomed to fail—so long as
reformers temper their expectations and implement the bill with the
competing interests of the court system in mind.
II. CASH BAIL: A HISTORY OF FRUSTRATED REFORM EFFORTS
A. Cash Bail and Reform in the United States
The American cash bail system, like most of the American legal
system, has its roots in English law.35 Early English law allowed
sheriffs wide discretion to deny bail, but a series of reforms
culminating in the Bill of Rights of 1689 limited the denial of bail and
led to a presumption of granting bail for all noncapital cases.36
The early American legal system adopted this presumption, and
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries American courts
considered denying bail in noncapital cases a violation of the
presumption of innocence.37 The Framers also included the common
law prohibition against excessive bail in the Bill of Rights with the
Eighth Amendment.38 The purpose of bail in this early period of
American history was to ensure that the defendant returned for trial,

35. John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the
Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1733 (2018).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required . . . .”).
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not to keep the public safe by preventing additional crimes. 39 Rather
than require bail, it was far more common for an accused to be released
into a third party’s custody.40 This third party would ensure the
accused’s reappearance either by personally vouching for them or by
putting up their own property as collateral; this was called a surety
bond.41
The commercial bail bond industry began to supersede the surety
system in the late nineteenth century, leading to a system that favored
the rich over the poor. Now a defendant’s personal wealth, rather than
a voucher from his friends, could guarantee his pretrial freedom.42 In
1927, a study reported that the bail system in Chicago led to a higher
proportion of arrestees who could not afford even small amounts of
bail and so were forced to stay in jail.43 Another study in the 1950s
noted that many arrestees in Philadelphia were unable to afford their
release and thus pleaded guilty in order to avoid jail time.44 Outraged
by the “plight of poor defendants in crowded jails,” activists began
pushing for bail reform in the early 1960s.45
The most notable reform effort is the 1961 Manhattan Bail
Project, started by a social worker, Herbert Sturz, and a wealthy
philanthropist, Louis Schweitzer.46 Sturz and Schweitzer were
shocked by the squalid conditions of New York’s pretrial detention
facilities.47 The two set up an experiment, staffed by volunteers, that
interviewed and ran background checks on arrestees in an attempt to
obviate the need for cash bail altogether.48 If the volunteers found that
the arrestee had sufficient ties to the community, they would
recommend to the judge that the arrestee be released on his own
recognizance: a promise that he would return for his court date.49 The
volunteers would then stay in touch with the arrestees to remind them

39. Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 731
(2011); see also Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. 704, 710 (1835) (holding that the purpose of bail was
to “compel[] the party to submit to the trial and punishment, which the law ordains for his offence”).
40. Feeley, supra note 22, at 684.
41. See Koepke & Robinson, supra note 35, at 1733.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1735.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Feeley, supra note 22, at 692.
47. Id. at 682–83.
48. Id. at 682.
49. Id.
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of their upcoming court appearances.50 After a year, the Project
evaluated itself and found that out of 250 arrestees who had been
released, only three failed to appear.51
The Manhattan Bail Project’s success garnered the attention of
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who launched the 1964 National
Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice to change the country’s bail
laws.52 The conference eventually led to Congress passing the Bail
Reform Act of 1966, which was meant to “assure that all persons,
regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained”
pretrial.53 In general, the act established that a defendant’s financial
status should not be a factor in denying release.54 Also of importance,
the act authorized a judge to consider a defendant’s dangerousness as
a reason to deny bail—the first time in American history this had
explicitly been authorized.55
This provision opened the door to an eventual about-face in the
purpose of bail—from ensuring an arrestee’s return for trial to
ensuring the safety of the community. As crime rates rose in the late
1960s and early 1970s and the political winds shifted sharply,
commentators opined that bail reform efforts ignored the crimes
committed by those released pretrial, and that new reforms were
required to ensure public safety.56 These concerns were not
unfounded; even today, arrestees who post bail and then commit
another crime are all too common.57 Richard Nixon was elected
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970); see also Sarah Johnson, Bail Reform, BILL TRACK 50 (Oct. 6,
2017), https://www.billtrack50.com/blog/social-issues/civil-rights/bail-reform/ (“[T]he purpose of
this act is to ensure that all persons, regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be
detained pending their charges . . . when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public
interest.”).
54. Koepke & Robinson, supra note 35, at 1736.
55. Id. at 1736–37.
56. Warren L. Miller, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: Need for Reform in 1969, 19 CATH. U. L.
REV. 24, 32 (1969).
57. See, e.g., Teri Figueroa, When People on Bail Commit New Crimes, They’re Often Linked
to
Drugs,
SAN
DIEGO
UNION-TRIB.
(Sept. 30,
2018,
5:00
AM),
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/public-safety/sd-me-bail-crime-data-20180926story.html (describing how 4,149 people committed new felonies between October 2011 through
August 2018 while released on bail, and how many of the new crimes were drug offenses); Kirsten
Fiscus, Out on Bond, Arrested Again: When Constitutional Rights Clash with Public Safety,
MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER
(Aug. 31,
2018,
1:59
PM),
https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/crime/2018/08/31/out-bond-arrested-againwhen-constitutional-rights-clash-public-safety-bail-violent-repeat-offender/945143002
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against the backdrop of rising panic over crime rates, and he made
preventive pretrial detention a focus of his “War on Crime.”58
Preventive detention was not popular just because it purportedly
made the streets safer. It also was very popular amongst prosecutors
and police because it helped the system function much more
efficiently.59 Prosecutors knew (and still know) that, once a defendant
is forced to sit in jail, the defendant is more likely to plead guilty to
get out of jail, even if he did not do the alleged crime; essentially,
forcing a defendant to remain behind bars increases the number of
convictions that prosecutors get.60 Prosecutors also viewed preventive
detention as a central part of their mission: to “reduce crime and
protect society.”61
The push towards preventive detention reached its zenith when
the Reagan Administration passed the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which
required judges to predict the danger levels an arrestee presented to
the community before releasing him.62 The Supreme Court found the
act constitutional in United States v. Salerno,63 explicitly sanctioning
preventive detention based on an arrestee’s danger to society.64
Salerno completed the reversal in the nation’s approach to bail reform.
The idealistic reform movements of the mid-1960s, which sought to
reduce pretrial detention based on poverty, ended up having very little

(discussing how, in Montgomery County, Alabama, four arrestees were released on bail despite
being charged with murder, and then went on to reoffend); Paul Milo, Bail Reform Again Criticized
After Freed Newark Suspect Charged in Shooting, NJ.COM (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://www.nj.com/essex/2017/03/bail_reform_again_criticized_after_freed_newark_su.html
(reporting a man released pursuant to New Jersey bail reform law charged with aggravated assault).
58. Koepke & Robinson, supra note 35, at 1739.
59. SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL
IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19–20 (2018).
60. Id.; see also Jeffrey Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the
Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 441, 456–57 (noting that only 1 percent
to 10 percent of defendants who are detained pretrial make it to trial—most accept a plea bargain).
Interestingly, this use of pretrial detention in the United States shares many similarities with its use
in Latin America. The largest population of pretrial detainees in the world is found in Latin
America, and detention is often used “frequently—and often arbitrarily.” This results in countries
such as Bolivia having over 80 percent of their prison populations made up of pretrial detainees.
Marguerite Cawley, Mapping Latin America’s Pretrial Detention Populations, INSIGHT CRIME
(Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/mapping-latin-americas-pretrialdetention-populations/.
61. Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 335, 340 (1990).
62. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 59, at 25.
63. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
64. See id.
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effect; in fact, the end result was a much more expansive system of
pretrial detention.65
Due to the preventive detention movement, courts began using
money bail as a tool to detain based on pretrial crime risk.66 As such,
since 1990, pretrial detention rates67 and courts’ use of money bail
have skyrocketed.68 These trends have led to well-documented
injustices. The most obvious is the inherent classism of a money-bail
system. Many of those detained pretrial are held because they cannot
afford their bail, a problem that obviously does not affect wealthy
arrestees.69 Racism is also a not-so-hidden evil of the system. Due to
pervasive problems of race bias in the criminal justice system,70
Hispanic and black defendants are more likely to be detained pretrial
than similarly situated white defendants.71 Widespread pretrial
detention also places crippling costs on both individuals and their
communities. Studies have shown that contact with the criminal
justice system, even for a short time, tends to have criminogenic
consequences; as such, pretrial detention makes a person more likely
65. Koepke & Robinson, supra note 35, at 1743 (“[W]hat began in the mid-1960s as an effort
to reduce poverty-based pretrial detention ended in the mid-1980s with a law that led to
immediate—and lasting—increases in pretrial detention.”).
66. Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 547
(2012) (noting that “judges are basing their [bail] decisions far more on predicted violence than on
predicted flight”); Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 434 (2016)
(highlighting the “stiff, often successful resistance from the powerful bail bondsman lobby” that
any effort to limit money bail has met).
67. Cf. DARRELL K. GILLIARD & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 1996, (1997),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pjimy96.pdf; MINTON & ZENG, supra note 16, at 3 (estimating
that there were approximately 467,500 people awaiting trial in local jails in 2014 on any given day).
68. THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 2 (2007),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf (finding that between 1990 and 1994, 41 percent of
pretrial releases were on recognizance compared to 24 percent by cash bail; in 2004, 23 percent of
releases were on recognizance and 42 percent were by cash bail).
69. See Levin, supra note 15.
70. See Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence that the Criminal-Justice System is
Racist.
Here’s
the
Proof.,
WASH.
POST
(Sept. 18,
2018,
6:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/18/theres-overwhelming-evidencethat-the-criminal-justice-system-is-racist-heres-the-proof/?utm_term=.89499895294d.
71. Stephen Demuth & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Impact of Gender and Race-Ethnicity in
the Pretrial Release Process, 51 SOC. PROBS. 222, 233–34 (2004). Black defendants are 1.5 times
more likely to be detained pretrial than white defendants, while Hispanic defendants are 1.8 times
more likely to be detained than white defendants. Id. This is mostly because racial minorities are
far more likely to have to pay bail rather than be released on recognizance; black defendants are
twice as likely as white defendants to be assigned bail, while Hispanics are 1.4 times as likely to
be assigned bail. Id.
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to commit a crime in the future.72 Because those detained pretrial tend
to be those that can’t afford bail, they also have less access to
competent legal aid, making those detained more likely to be
sentenced to jail than those released pretrial73 and likelier to face
longer sentences.74 Detention also leads those who are innocent to
accept plea offers simply so they can go home—the only other option
being to sit in jail until trial.75 Should they instead choose to stay in
jail, they face the prospect of losing jobs, homes, and families.76
Finally, pretrial detention presents an enormous cost to the community
at large; taxpayers nationwide spend nearly $38 million per day on
detaining arrestees.77
In response to these problems, there has been a recent “thirdwave” of bail reforms to remedy the ills of cash bail.78 Spurred by civil
rights groups and national policy movements, several states have
begun implementing legislation that seeks to reduce or end the use of
money bail. For example, New Jersey’s Bail Reform and Speedy Trial
Act purports to almost completely end the use of money bail in that
state.79 While the spread of state legislative bail reform is encouraging,
there is not yet enough data to show whether the reforms have
significantly addressed bail’s major problems.80
These third-wave reforms generally seek to balance the dueling
goals of the previous two: releasing as many defendants pre-trial as
possible, while also preventively detaining those who are deemed to
72. See Heaton et al., supra note 21, at 718 (explaining that pretrial detainees are 30 percent
more likely to commit a felony and 20 percent more likely to commit a misdemeanor within
eighteen months of their detention than those similarly situated but released pretrial).
73. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUNDATION, PRETRIAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 2
(2013),
https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Pretrial-Criminal-JusticeResearch.pdf (“[D]efendants who were detained for the entire pretrial period were over four times
more likely to be sentenced to jail and over three times more likely to be sentenced to prison than
defendants who were released at some point pending trial.”).
74. Id. (finding that those detained pretrial were, on average, given sentences that were three
times longer than those released).
75. Heaton et al., supra note 21, at 714–16.
76. See JUSTICE REVIEW COMM., SANTA CLARA CTY. HUMAN RELATIONS COMM’N, REPORT
ON THE “PUBLIC FORUM FOR FAMILY AND FRIENDS OF INMATES” 36–37 (2016),
https://www.sccgov.org/sites/hrcon/Documents/SCCHRCJailReportFINAL_04-26-16.pdf.
77. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 18.
78. Timothy R. Schnacke et al., The Third Generation of Bail Reform, DEN. L. REV. (Mar. 14,
2011),
https://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-online-article/2011/3/14/the-third-generation-ofbail-reform.html?rq=schnacke.
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2019).
80. See, e.g., Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303,
340 (2018).
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be dangerous.81 Despite the hopes of more idealistic reformers, it will
be impossible to implement bail reforms that release nearly all
defendants; prosecutors, law enforcement officers, victims’ rights
groups, and bail bondsmen will all vigorously oppose any measure so
broad.82 As a result, though some reform groups seek completely
liberalized pretrial detention,83 more realistic reforms will seek to
balance the two competing interests. The criminal justice system must
offer some measure of safety, and the public is unlikely to feel safe
unless there is some form of preventive detention.84
B. History of Cash Bail in California: From the California
Constitution to SB 10
Pretrial release has been an element of California’s legal system
since the state was established. Both the 1849 and 1879 versions of
the California Constitution included sections that were identical to the
Eighth Amendment in forbidding the use of excessive bail.85
However, those at the California Constitutional Convention felt it was
important to add a second provision, specifically providing that “all
persons shall be bailable . . . unless for capital offences, when the
proof is evident or the presumption great.”86 Without this clause, those

81. S.B. 10 § 1, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (“It is the intent of the
Legislature by enacting this measure to permit preventive detention of pretrial defendants only in
a manner that is consistent with the United States Constitution . . . and only to the extent permitted
by the California Constitution.”).
82. See, e.g., Bail: Pretrial Release: Hearing on S.B. 10 Before the S. Comm. on Pub. Safety,
supra note 30, at 14–15 (“SB 10 would endanger public safety by forcing release of . . . high risk
misdemeanor defendants without bail. Bail is an important public safety tool because it is paid for
by the defendants [sic] family and close friends who cosign the bail agreement vouch for the
defendant. These cosigners now have a financial incentive to make sure defendant attends all of his
or her court dates.”).
83. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “NOT IN IT FOR JUSTICE”: HOW CALIFORNIA’S
PRETRIAL DETENTION AND BAIL SYSTEM UNFAIRLY PUNISHES POOR PEOPLE 3 (2017),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/usbail0417_web_0.pdf
(arguing
that
California’s bail system should be replaced by a citation system, whereby almost all defendants are
booked and released immediately).
84. See, e.g., Marc Klaas, California Bail Reform Bill May Be Trendy, but It Would Hurt
Victims’
Rights,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Mar. 28,
2018,
6:27
AM),
https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article207085264.html (arguing that legislators
should not follow the “current trend in criminal justice legislation that puts more value on the rights
of accused criminals than it does on the health, safety, and welfare of crime victims or the greater
public at large”).
85. CAL. CONST. OF 1849, art. I, § 6; CAL. CONST. OF 1879, art. I, § 6 (“Excessive bail shall
not be required . . . .”).
86. CAL. CONST. OF 1849, art. I, § 7.
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at the convention feared “an innocent man may be kept in prison and
refused bail.”87
Even at this early point in California’s legal history, members of
the convention were concerned about judges abusing their
discretion—despite judicial discretion being limited to capital cases
and requiring a finding that “proof [was] evident or the presumption
great.”88 One member refused to vote for the new clause, worried that,
if “left to the courts to decide,” they may “decide it in their own
way.”89 Because the standard was so indefinite, he was concerned that
its use might “lead to acts of injustice and partiality.”90
Despite the lofty intentions of the California Constitutional
Convention, problems in the bail system emerged rather quickly. A
study of Alameda’s court system in the early period of California’s
statehood demonstrated how the bail provisions of the California
Constitution were actually implemented. Similar to courts around the
country, California courts were not supposed to use bail to keep
dangerous people behind bars.91 However, in practice, using bail to
detain the dangerous was common.92 Furthermore, those that were
granted bail typically could not afford it.93 Between 1880 and 1910,
an average of 80.4 percent of detainees did not make bail.94 In a pattern
that has repeated itself to the present day, those who made bail were
much more likely to be acquitted or have their charges dismissed than
those who did not.95 Clearly, California’s early courts were not free
from the inequities that still exist.
The problems were exacerbated by the introduction of a
mandatory bail schedule for misdemeanor offenses in 1945.96 Though
87. J. ROSS BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA, ON
THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849 579 (1850),
https://cdn.loc.gov//service/gdc/calbk/196.pdf.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 162 (Morris S. Arnold ed., 1981).
92. Id. (citing the case of Isabella Martin, who had attempted to dynamite the home of a
superior court judge, an act of violence that so appalled the judge on her case that he set Martin’s
bail at $50,000, a large sum today that was enormous in the late nineteenth century to ensure that
she remained in prison).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 163.
95. Id. at 165–66.
96. WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 211–12 (1976) (citing CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1269(b) (1970) (instituting mandatory bail schedules for felonies in 1973)).
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the bail schedule was intended to help arrestees get out of jail before
their first court appearance, it became a tool used by the courts to
routinize the pretrial release hearing.97 By using the offense
underlying the arrest as a presumptive means of determining the bail
amount, courts deprived arrestees of an individualized release
determination.98 This only worsened the bail system’s unequal effects
on the poor, since similarly charged people would have different
chances of release based on their ability to afford bail.99
By the 1960s, a large proportion of arrestees remained in jail prior
to trial, despite the mandates of the California Constitution.100
Scholars of the time decried California’s “anachronistic system” of
bail and proposed implementing systems that operated like the
Manhattan Bail Project.101 Soon enough, idealists began attempting
reform, both in the legislature and in the form of bail projects.102 In
the late 1960s, California began the process of revising its constitution,
recommending that article 1, section 6 be revised to include a
provision for release on recognizance.103 The electorate eventually
adopted the proposed change, which became article 1, section 12.104
Despite the legislature’s emphasis on release on recognizance,
practical reform efforts in California took a different tack. Perhaps
because the commercial bond industry was founded in California,
bondsmen were more powerful than in other states, and the idea of
eliminating (or even drastically reducing) money bail was never
seriously considered.105 Because of this, the alternative release

97. Scott-Hayward & Ottone, supra note 24, at 172.
98. Id. at 167, 170.
99. John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 9 n.31 (1985).
100. See FORD FOUND. & CTY. OF ALAMEDA, PRE-TRIAL RELEASE IN OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA
28 (1967) (finding that 64 percent of felony arrestees and 39 percent of misdemeanor arrestees
remained in jail until trial).
101. See, e.g., Dan Lang, Beyond the Bail System: A Proposal for Pretrial Release in
California, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1112, 1112 (1969).
102. Id. at 1125.
103. PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM:
RECOMMENDATIONS
TO
THE
CHIEF
JUSTICE
21
(2017),
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/PDRReport-20171023.pdf [hereinafter PDR REPORT].
104. Id.; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“A person may be released on his or her own recognizance
in the court’s discretion.”).
105. MALCOLM C. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 40
(1983).
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programs made popular in Manhattan and much of the rest of the
country were generally small and poorly funded in California.106
However, there was one exception. Oakland established a releaseon-recognizance unit in 1964 that was well funded by the Ford
Foundation.107 Unfortunately, this increased funding did not lead to
significant change. Although nonmonetary releases initially increased
by a small amount, most of those released were people who would
have been able to afford bail anyway.108 The supervisors of the project
were so scared of failure—of a rise in rates of failure to appear for trial
or of crimes committed by those released—that they ended up treating
arrestees more conservatively than the courts had.109 Eventually, the
grant from the Ford Foundation ran dry and the project had to be taken
up by the court system. Under the auspices of the court’s probation
department, the project continued to reduce nonmonetary releases.110
The program’s ultimate absorption by the court system led it to effect
the exact opposite of the change it was hoping for; a program that was
instituted to increase pretrial release ended up substantially reducing
it.111 Other less well-funded reform efforts around the state faced
similar challenges and produced similar results.112
After a decade of reform attempts, not much had changed. Indeed,
in 1979, more than a decade after the legislature revised the California
Constitution to include an on-recognizance provision, Governor Jerry
Brown (in his first incarnation) declared that further reform was
necessary.113
However, in response to rapidly elevating crime rates, public
opinion in California turned against the rights of pretrial defendants in

106. Id. at 41. In the late 1970s, Los Angeles County had a pretrial release budget that was
equal to half of Brooklyn’s, and San Francisco had a pretrial release budget of $200,000—slightly
more than Staten Island’s. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 43.
110. THOMAS, supra note 96, at 130.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 121–22 (noting that, despite initial successes, the San Francisco bail project
needed to claw tooth and nail to stay funded); see also FEELEY, supra note 105, at 44 (describing
how, though the San Francisco bail project survived, it “operated out of a cubbyhole” and “was a
shoestring operation” that “kept its records on three-by-five cards filed in old shoeboxes,” but,
nonetheless, produced similar results to the much better-funded Oakland project).
113. Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., State of the State Address (Jan. 16, 1979).
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the early 1980s.114 In 1982, voters passed two propositions—
Proposition 4, which revised article 1, section 12 of the California
Constitution to explicitly allow courts to consider public safety in
setting bail,115 and Proposition 8, known as the “Victim’s Bill of
Rights,” which proposed repealing section 12 completely, replacing it
with a stricter system of bail and pretrial release.116 Though
Proposition 8’s pretrial provisions did not ultimately go into effect, the
fact that they were passed shows how public sentiment turned against
pretrial defendants.117
California’s counter-reform movement had an even starker effect
on pretrial detention rates than did the United States as a whole.
California now detains 59 percent of felony defendants before trial,
compared to a nationwide average rate of 32 percent.118 Increased
detention has not led to productive results; rates of pretrial misconduct
are generally higher in California than they are elsewhere.119 The issue
is exacerbated in California by the mandatory use of bail schedules,
which courts tend to use presumptively to set bail amounts in ways
that might violate both the United States and California
Constitutions.120 As a result, the median bail in California is five times

114. See, e.g., David Yamamoto, The Problems Facing California’s New Bail Standard, 5
GLENDALE L. REV. 203, 203 (1983) (asserting that “a major concern in today’s society is the
inadequacy of our traditional bail standard to deal realistically with the dangerous and violent
crimes committed by persons released on bail”).
115. People v. Standish, 135 P.3d 32, 41–42 (Cal. 2006) (“[Proposition 4] permitted courts
setting bail to consider other factors other than the probability that a defendant would appear at
trial. . . . [T]he proponents of the measure made it clear they intended that public safety should be
a consideration in bail decisions.”).
116. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET FOR 1982, PRIMARY 32–35
(1982), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1917&context=
ca_ballot_props. Note that California was ahead of the curve in effecting counter-reform; the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 was still two years away. See supra text accompanying note 62.
117. See In re York, 892 P.2d 804, 807 n.4 (Cal. 1995) (holding that, because Proposition 4
received more votes than Proposition 8, its provisions prevailed over Proposition 8’s). But see PDR
REPORT, supra note 103, at 23 n.63. In spite of the holding in In re York, voters passed the Victims’
Bill of Rights Act of 2008, which, without repealing article 1, section 12, reinserted the previously
defunct bail provisions of 1982’s Proposition 8. Id. As of yet, no California court has interpreted
how these two provisions work together. Id.
118. Tafoya, supra note 23.
119. TAFOYA ET AL., supra note 27, at 15.
120. See Scott-Hayward & Ottone, supra note 24, at 173, 178 (based on an empirical survey of
two California county court systems, finding that in both, “bail schedules are the main factor
considered by judges at felony arraignments, . . . judges do not take into consideration an
individual’s ability to pay, and . . . the schedules appear to operate presumptively, without any
individualized determination”).
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higher than it is in the rest of the country.121 A recent lawsuit filed on
behalf of pretrial arrestees alleged that the California bail industry
conspired to keep premiums high for defendants, thereby further
worsening the problem.122 Over a two year period, California
taxpayers spent $37.5 million in just six counties to house defendants
whose cases were never filed or were dismissed.123 The numbers
indicate that there is racial bias in judges’ pretrial release decisions as
well; almost 50 percent of whites are released pretrial, compared to
only 38 percent of Latinos and 34 percent of African-Americans.124 It
is against this backdrop that California’s own “third wave” of bail
reform rose.
C. SB 10 and the Third Wave of California Bail Reform
The push for a new wave of bail reform in California has mirrored
efforts in the rest of the country. Specifically, since 2012, California
legislators and reformers have advocated for expanding pretrial
release, whether that be through use of risk assessment algorithms or
through an increase in book-and-release citations.125
Though early-decade legislation was never able to make it
through the legislature, the calls for bail reform caught the attention of
Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye of the California Supreme Court. In
her 2016 State of the Judiciary Address, she instructed legislators that
they could not continue to ignore the problems caused by cash bail.126
She then established the Pretrial Detention Reform Workgroup to
evaluate the current bail system and make recommendations for
improvement.127 The workgroup’s report found that “California’s

121. It’s Time to Do Away with California’s Cash Bail System, supra note 28.
122. Jazmine Ulloa, Bail Companies in California Have Conspired to Keep Premiums High,
Lawsuit Alleges, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019, 1:40 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-cacalifornia-bail-surety-lawsuit-20190129-story.html.
123. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 3.
124. TAFOYA ET AL., supra note 27, at 3 (noting that further study of these statistics is required,
as the disparity might be caused by differences in offenses, booking status, and the month/county
of booking).
125. See PDR REPORT, supra note 103, at 98–99 (Proposals to increase on-recognizance release
based on risk assessment included Senate Bill 210 (Hancock, 2012), Senate Bill 1180 (Hancock,
2012), and Senate Bill 210 (Hancock, 2014); all three stalled in the legislature.); see also HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83, at 104 (arguing that California should adopt an expansive use of
simple book-and-release with citations).
126. Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Cal., 2016 State of the Judiciary
Address (Mar. 8, 2016).
127. PDR REPORT, supra note 103, at 5.
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current pretrial release and detention system unnecessarily
compromises victim and public safety because it bases a person’s
liberty on financial resources rather than the likelihood of future
criminal behavior and exacerbates socioeconomic disparities and
racial bias.”128 The workgroup then recommended widespread
implementation of risk assessment procedures as a fix.129
The legislature responded with SB 10, the California Money Bail
Reform Act of 2017.130 The bill, introduced by Senator Hertzberg and
co-sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), had the
stated intent of “safely reducing the number of people detained
pretrial, while addressing racial and economic disparities in the
pretrial system.”131 As originally written, the bill would create a
presumption of release for most defendants, subject to a risk
assessment132 conducted by a tool that would be implemented statewide.133 The only defendants that could be held were those who: (1)
had committed capital crimes; and (2) had committed felony offenses
for which the presumption of guilt was great and there was a
substantial likelihood—as determined by either the risk assessment
tool or the judge—that the persons’ release would result in harm to
another.134
An outpouring of opposition came from law enforcement
interests, bail bondsmen, and the Judicial Council.135 Chief Justice
128. Id. at 1.
129. Id. at 2.
130. S. B. 10 § 2, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). There are also currently several
cases pending before federal courts and the California Supreme Court regarding defendants’ rights
to pretrial release. See In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (Ct. App. 2018); Third Amended
Class Action Complaint, Buffin v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 4:15-CV-04959 (N.D. Cal.
May 27, 2016); Amended Class Action Complaint, Welchen v. County of Sacramento, 343 F. Supp.
3d 924 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 2:16-CV-00185).
131. S.B. 10 § 2, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
132. Risk assessment tools are computer programs that use historical data to predict how likely
someone is to commit a crime or fail to appear at trial in the future. The prediction is generated by
analyzing factors such as “age, gender, criminal record, employment status, education level, etc.,”
and then identifying how closely those factors have correlated to a defendant who commits crime
or fails to appear. See Stevenson, supra note 80, at 304.
133. Id.
134. Bail: Pretrial Release: Hearing on S.B. 10 Before the S. Comm. on Pub. Safety, supra note
30, at 12–13.
135. Id. at 14–15 (centering opposition arguments around the risk to public safety that
eliminating cash bail threatened); see also Taryn Luna, No California Bail Reform This Year,
Governor
Announces,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Aug. 25,
2017,
11:03
AM),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article169364312.html (reporting
stiff opposition to SB 10).
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Cantil-Sakauye conceptually agreed with the bill but thought that it
“[did] not establish a reasonable or realistic balance” between concern
for public safety and administrative concerns.136 She was particularly
worried that the bill eliminated judicial discretion, placing too much
power in the hands of the pretrial services agency that made the risk
assessment.137
After a year of negotiations, the legislature revealed a new version
of the bill on August 20, 2018. Lawmakers had substantially revised
the bill without the input of community representatives or advocacy
groups and had widely expanded the preventive detention
possibilities.138 Gone was the intent to “safely reduce the number of
people detained pretrial”; it had been replaced with an intent to “permit
preventive detention of pretrial defendants.”139 No longer was there a
broad presumption in favor of pretrial release; judges now had wide
discretion to detain.140 There was an expansive list of enumerated
offenses that precluded a defendant from pretrial release, and the
revised bill allowed for local courts to create as many exceptions as
they deemed necessary.141 The bill also allowed the local judiciary
136. Alexei Koseff, Ending Bail Worries California Judges, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 11, 2017,
6:00
AM),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitolalert/article160636989.html.
137. Id.
138. Jasmine Tyler & John Raphling, Human Rights Watch Urges Governor Brown of
California to Veto Senate Bill 10, The California Bail Reform Act, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 24,
2018, 12:16 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/24/human-rights-watch-urges-governorbrown-california-veto-senate-bill-10-california#_ftnref8.
139. S.B. 10 § 1, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
140. See S.B. 10 § 1320.18(d), 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (“If the court
determines there is a substantial likelihood that no nonmonetary condition or combination of
conditions of pretrial supervision will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant at the
preventive detention hearing or reasonably assure public safety prior to the preventive detention
hearing, the court may detain the defendant pending a preventive detention hearing, and shall state
the reasons for detention on the record.”).
141. S.B. 10 § 1320.10, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (defining offenses that
automatically preclude pretrial release to include: (1) persons assessed as high risk by the risk
assessment tool; (2) persons arrested for certain sex crimes; (3) persons arrested for domestic
violence; (4) persons arrested for stalking; (5) persons arrested for violent felonies; (6) persons
arrested for their third DUI in the last ten years; (7) persons who have violated any type of
restraining order in the last five years; (8) persons who have three or more failures to appear in the
last twelve months; (9) persons who already have a pending trial or sentencing for a misdemeanor
or felony; (10) persons who are under any form of postconviction supervision other than informal
court supervision; (11) persons who have intimidated a witness or victim of the current crime; (12)
persons who have violated a condition of release within the last five years; and (13) persons who
have been convicted of a violent or serious felony within the past five years); see also id. § 1320.11
(“The local rule may further expand the list of offenses and factors for which prearraignment release
of persons assessed as medium risk is not permitted . . . .”).

(11) 53.1_PETERSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

5/20/2020 6:36 PM

SB 10 AND THE FUTURE OF BAIL IN CALIFORNIA

283

unfettered discretion in implementing risk assessment analysis,
allowing them to expand the pool of those ineligible for release nearly
at will.142 Though the revised bill was met with vociferous complaints
from the human rights groups that had previously supported it,143
Governor Brown quickly signed it into law on August 28, 2018.144 SB
10 originally was to take effect in October 2019, but a concerted push
from the bail industry gathered over 500,000 signatures—far more
than the 200,000 required—in support of a voter referendum on the
law.145 As a result, the future of SB 10 lies with California voters, who
will decide whether the law takes effect in November 2020.
III. WHY DO CRIMINAL REFORMS FAIL AND WHAT CAN WE LEARN
FROM THAT FAILURE?
The pattern of criminal justice reform is similar to a scene from
the movie Bartleby.146 In that scene, an office manager in his boredom
winds up a toy rabbit, which then jumps up and down.147 The man is
surprised, picks the rabbit back up, and winds it again.148 Much to his
shock, it once again jumps.149 The pattern repeats itself over and
over.150 Criminal justice reformers are not so different from the bored
office manager.151 They attempt the same—or substantially similar—
reforms over and over again, expressing the same shock the office
manager does when those reforms don’t succeed as planned—or
simply outright fail.152 Why is this? Why, despite repeated failure in
the criminal reform process, can’t reformers do any better?
142. See id. § 1320.24.
143. See Tyler & Raphling, supra note 138; see also Daisy Vieyra, ACLU of California
Statement: Governor Brown Signs Bail Reform Legislation Opposed by ACLU, AM. C.L. UNION
SO. CAL. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/press-releases/aclu-california-statementgovernor-brown-signs-bail-reform-legislation-opposed-aclu (arguing against the new iteration of
SB 10).
144. Governor Brown Signs Legislation to Revamp California’s Bail System, Protect Public
Safety,
OFF.
GOVERNOR
EDMUND
G.
BROWN,
JR.
(Aug. 28,
2018),
https://www.ca.gov/archive/gov39/2018/08/28/governor-brown-signs-legislation-to-revampcalifornias-bail-system-protect-public-safety/index.html.
145. McGough, supra note 31.
146. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Jumping Bunnies and Legal Rules: The Organizational
Sociologist and the Legal Scholar Should Be Friends, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING
246, 246 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Napatoff eds. 2017).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
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The simple answer is that criminal reformers have traditionally
ignored the lessons of history. Often high-minded idealists, reformers
tend to approach their projects as if the problem and solution are
unprecedented.153 They operate as crisis thinkers, initiating bold
crusades that purport to offer bold, simple solutions to complex
problems.154 Because reformers tend to oversimplify the problems
they face, expectations are set too high.155 Those high expectations are
nearly always dashed, however, because idealistic reformers are not
the only force at play in criminal reform. The history of criminal
justice reform shows a pattern of competing forces, which often tend
to be ignored by those idealists who hope to enact meaningful
change.156
The first force is that of the moral idealist, who posits an idea for
reform based on her view of an ideal society and supports her idea
with values of “rightness or goodness.”157 The moral idealist will often
sell her idea with broad, simple claims, since, practically, that is the
only way to garner public support for the movement.158 This initial
force can be seen in every attempt at bail reform, throughout both the
histories of the nation as a whole and California. Arthur Beeley, Caleb
Foote, Herbert Sturz, and Louis Schweitzer all were appalled by the
standard of pretrial detention in the early twentieth century and
implemented crusades to fix it.159 The Ford Foundation’s funding of
the pretrial services agency in Oakland was similarly high-minded.160
That call for reform is quickly met by the second force: those who
represent society’s need for order.161 Whereas the idealist typically
approaches her ideas with the welfare of the accused in mind, those
who represent the need for order respond with society’s need to
suppress crime.162 Indeed, a reform typically will not win general
acceptance until it promises to more effectively punish criminals in a
153. See Feeley, supra note 22, at 677.
154. See id. at 683.
155. GREG BERMAN & AUBREY FOX, TRIAL AND ERROR IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM:
LEARNING FROM FAILURE 115–16, 118 (2010).
156. Samuel Pillsbury, Understanding Penal Reform: The Dynamic of Change, 80 NW. U. J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 728 (1989).
157. Id. at 726–27.
158. Id.
159. Feeley, supra note 22, at 682–83.
160. See FEELEY, supra note 105, at 41.
161. Pillsbury, supra note 156, at 727.
162. Id.
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way that satisfies society’s need for retribution.163 While occasionally
the two forces—idealist and reactionary—can work in harmony, with
a new reform purporting to allow for both more justice and more order,
the interests of the idealist tend to lose out once the reform is actually
implemented.164
The starkest example of this reactionary force in modern bail
reform is the counter-reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s that
culminated with the Bail Reform Act of 1984.165 The public blamed
rising crime rates on an overly liberal system of pretrial release, and
tough-on-crime government actors responded by explicitly
authorizing courts to preventively detain arrestees who were deemed
unsafe.166 At first, it seemed as if the two ideals might be able to
coexist; Salerno instructed courts to treat pretrial release as the norm,
with arrestees only detained if they truly were a public safety threat.167
As seen above, however, the hopes of the idealists—to liberalize
pretrial release such that far fewer arrestees were detained—were
dashed, with the counter-reform resulting in skyrocketing detention
rates that have endured to this day.168
The third, final, and perhaps most powerful force is that of the
criminal justice institution itself: the judges, prosecutors, defenders,
and probation officers that must implement any new system of
reform.169 Above all, these actors are interested in efficiency. Since
they are the ones ultimately responsible for implementing reforms,
their interests tend to override all others, and they often end up
“capturing” the reform for their own purposes.170 The criminal justice
system is also fragmented by design, with the actors that make up the
system pitted against each other in an adversarial scheme.171 Because
the system is so complex and disorganized, everyone has their own
motivations and nobody has control.172 These differing motivations
are fueled by conflicts in values; some judges believe that the purpose
of imprisonment is to rehabilitate, while others believe it is to
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
See supra, Part II(A).
Id.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
See supra, Part II(A).
Pillsbury, supra note 156, at 727.
Id.
Feeley, supra note 22, at 703.
FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 91, at 324.
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punish.173 The criminal court system has been compared to a leaky
hose: “You can turn the pressure up at one end, but this . . . does not
pump out more water at the other. More pressure simply means more
leaks.”174
The history of bail reform is rife with examples of this third
force’s influence as well. For example, one need only look at how
pretrial detention rose immediately once the independently funded
pretrial service in Oakland was absorbed by the local probation
department.175 Or at the way current California courts implement
statutory instructions to individually determine every arrestee’s
situation before setting bail.176 In short, they completely ignore
them.177 California courts are not alone in this; as early as 1974,
scholars were lamenting how courts nationwide completely ignored
reform-based instructions to liberalize pretrial release.178
SB 10, and California bail reform in general, is already being
buffeted by the first two forces of reform. The first was represented on
several fronts; human rights groups have been calling for a
liberalization of bail for years.179 In early 2018, a California Court of
Appeal declared the standardized use of bail schedules
unconstitutional and called on the legislature to implement reforms.180
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye called for broad bail reform in her 2016
State of the Judiciary Address.181 The second force is represented by
California’s law-and-order types. The most vehement representative
of this front is the bail bond lobby, as they fight to protect both public
safety and their imminent extinction should SB 10 be enacted.182 After
SB 10 passed, the bail lobby flexed its muscle, quickly collecting
173. See generally JOHN HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS 15 (1971) (describing
this clash of values).
174. FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 91, at 324.
175. See supra, Part II(B).
176. See Scott-Hayward & Ottone, supra note 24, at 168.
177. Id.
178. PAUL B. WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE: A NATIONAL STUDY OF PRETRIAL RELEASE 156
(1974) (“[S]tatutes clearly order judges to inquire as to the facts of the crime, the background of
the defendant, his financial condition, his past record and additional questions considered relevant
to the determination of bail. In courtroom after courtroom these statutory provisions were forgotten.
In Chicago, which is controlled by the progressive and comprehensive Illinois Bail Reform Act,
judges in the Holiday Court were found to be spending fifty-four seconds per defendant.”).
179. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 83.
180. In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 545 (Ct. App. 2018).
181. Cantil-Sakauye, supra note 126.
182. Blanca Garcia, Bail Industry Fights SB 10, SANTA BARBARA INDEP. (Oct. 11, 2018, 12:00
AM), https://www.independent.com/news/2018/oct/11/bail-industry-fights-sb-10.
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enough signatures to force a November 2020 voter referendum on SB
10.183 A final powerful group fighting against SB 10 are victims’ rights
advocates, who, like the other retributive interests, fear that more
liberalized pretrial release will lead to unsafe citizens and harm
victims’ interests in seeing those who have harmed them safely
detained.184
That leaves the third force; that of the criminal justice institutions.
These interests have not been silent thus far. The Judicial Council was
heavily involved in rewriting the relatively liberal original version of
SB 10.185 After the council’s involvement, SB 10 allowed for a much
larger use of judicial discretion and seemed to set the stage for
potentially limitless preventive detentions.186 The full effect of the
changes is yet to be seen.
This Note seeks to: (1) examine the ultimate influence that
criminal justice actors might wield on SB 10; and (2) how to expect
and account for it. As seen above, criminal reforms suffer from an
unfortunate pattern, one that involves failing to learn from past
mistakes—and being unable to anticipate future failures. California
has already seen the first and second forces—the idealists and the
reactionaries—clash over bail reform. Should SB 10 pass the 2020
referendum, however, its ultimate fate lies with the court system.
Therefore, by examining the motivations of criminal court actors, this
Note hopes to head off some of the mistakes of the past by allowing
reformers to anticipate the difficulties of implementation, understand
the motivations of and influences on employees of the court system,
and set a reasonable—if perhaps disappointingly tempered—standard
for what a successful SB 10 looks like in the future.
IV. THE COURT SYSTEM: MOTIVATIONS AND INFLUENCES
At the outset, it is important to examine the motivations of the
court system as a whole. There are certain aspects of the system that
tend to discourage innovation.187 First, because courts see a very high
volume of cases, there is a need within the system for established

183. McGough, supra note 31.
184. Klaas, supra note 84.
185. Supra, Part II(C).
186. Id.
187. See JERALD HAGE & MICHAEL AIKEN, SOCIAL CHANGE IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS
100 (1970).
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routines and rules that support those routines.188 Court actors become
comfortable with those routines and rules and are hesitant (if not
outright hostile) to changes.189 Second, courts have many segmented
pieces—judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys—which discourage
system-wide innovative thinking. Because this segmentation is also
inherently adversarial, court actors distrust each other and can often
be antagonistic.190 Finally, courts must emphasize efficiency in their
operations so as not to collapse under the weight of their caseloads,
which leads actors system-wide to stereotype cases and use informal
practices to process cases as quickly as possible.191 Any change
threatens to disrupt the typical, efficient manner of business, and thus
is heavily resisted.192
Understanding that courts tend to value efficiency and routine,
however, does not entirely get to the root of the issue. It is also
important to understand what motivates the different actors within the
court system, and how that motivation influences their actions.
A. Judges
It only seems natural to begin by examining the interests of the
central figures of the criminal court system: the judges. After all, it
will be up to judges to implement and routinize the new pretrial
services systems that SB 10 calls for. What has happened in the past
when judges have been statutorily instructed to liberalize pretrial
detention, sentencing, or parole? Why have judges reacted to those
reforms in the way they did? By teasing these answers out, perhaps it
is possible to predict with some accuracy how California judges might
implement SB 10.
There are many examples in California’s history of judges
undercutting reforms and reducing their hoped-for effects. In 1878, the
Goodwin Act purported to liberalize “good time” credit for prisoners,
allowing prisoners to go free earlier than they previously had been able
to.193 In the years after the Goodwin Act was implemented, judges in
Alameda County increased the average felony sentence by up to 30
percent, almost directly cancelling out the liberalizing effect the
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 91, at 215.
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legislature had hoped to enact.194 California enacted parole in 1893,
which resulted in judges doling out sentences that were two and a half
years longer than they were before the parole law.195 It seems that early
California judges were compensating for the new laws to ensure that
prisoners would serve the same amount of time as they had before.196
Judges did not react any more favorably to the bail reforms of the
1960s. Though there is less evidence of the outright counterbalancing
observed above, there is plenty of evidence of judges ignoring clear
statutory instructions either due to personal bias or to promote
efficiency.197 As previously discussed, the bail reform efforts of the
1960s tried to promulgate pretrial release based on individualized
factors for each defendant. Many bail reform statutes directly
instructed judges to consider the individual situation of each
defendant.198 A 1974 study of judicial activity with regards to bail,
however, found that judges often ignored these instructions due to
large caseloads.199 They also ignored them due to an apparent distrust,
dislike, and cynicism towards arrestees who appeared in their
courtrooms.200 Finally, judges viewed factors such as the seriousness
of the offense and the arrestee’s prior criminal history as far more
dispositive for setting bail than such “ephemeral” elements as the
arrestee’s ties to the community or his ability to pay.201
A final pertinent example comes from a study of San Diego area
courts in the late 1970s. One finding that stood out was that judges
were remarkably individualistic; they would not brook another judge
interfering with their authority over their own courtrooms, even if it
was the presiding judge.202 This led to a type of “friendly anarchy”
within the court, where each judge handled his courtroom in his own
194. Id. at 215–16.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 216.
197. FEELEY, supra note 105, at 125 (“A great many judges quite simply do not regard
liberalized pretrial release as desirable.”).
198. See WICE, supra note 178, at 156.
199. Id. at 30 (“[Judges] claim[ed] that they [were] barely able to go over the charges, glance
at the rap sheet, and hear a word about the case from the arresting officer before being urged on to
the next case by the clerk who apprehensively view[ed] the plethora of cases to be completed that
day.”).
200. Id. at 31 (describing how, in the words of one judge, defendants could not be trusted to
give truthful responses to questions).
201. Id.
202. PAMELA J. UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL
COURT 78 (1978).

(11) 53.1_PETERSON (DO NOT DELETE)

5/20/2020 6:36 PM

290

[Vol. 53:263

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

way.203 Any proposal to give the presiding judge more managing
power, even a proposal that seemed likely to improve the court’s
efficiency, was met with immediate suspicion and usually rejected.204
Another element of interest from the San Diego court study was
how judges were controlled by the use of peremptory challenges205 by
prosecutors.206 The peremptory challenge is a procedural tool that may
be used by any party if they are unhappy with the judge assigned to
their case, and is usable “without any further act or proof.”207 The
district attorney in San Diego would use the peremptory as a weapon
against judges who were too lenient in sentencing.208 One district
attorney even found a way of ensuring that his cases were never heard
(even initially) by a judge he found too liberal; he made clear that he
was prepared to challenge this particular judge every time his case was
assigned.209 The tactic worked, and the judge was assigned almost no
criminal overflow work.210
Modern studies provide further information on judicial
motivations and demonstrate that these motivations have not seriously
changed since the cited historical studies. Efficiency remains
paramount—a study of bail proceedings in Southern California in
2018 found that bail hearings were short or nonexistent, with one
judge describing the hearings as “Costco justice.”211 Just as the 1970s
study found, modern judges tend to err on the side of pretrial detention,
directly contravening the text of state constitutions or statutes that

203. Id. at 79.
204. Id. The author of the San Diego court study also studied the Alameda court system during
the 1970s. She found that, as in San Diego, judges in Alameda were fiercely independent. An
apparent catch-phrase in Alameda at the time was, “[n]o one can tell another judge how to run his
department . . . judges are autonomous . . . they can’t be forced into some pattern of conduct.” Id.
at 122.
205. The peremptory challenge is codified as California Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.
“A judge . . . shall not try a civil or criminal action . . . of any kind or character” when a party makes
a duly presented motion under penalty of perjury. Upon proper filing of the motion, that judge will
be replaced “without any further act or proof.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6(4) (West 2019).
206. UTZ, supra note 202, at 84.
207. CIV. PROC. § 170.6(4).
208. UTZ, supra note 202, at 84.
209. Id.
210. Id.; see also Feeley, supra note 22, at 709. Another example of a judge being removed
from criminal cases because of his liberal policies is the story of Judge Bruce Wright. Id. New York
district attorneys campaigned against him for setting low bail for criminals, and in response the
administrative judge transferred Wright from criminal court to civil court. Id.
211. Sarah Ottone & Christine Scott-Hayward, Pretrial Detention and the Decision to Impose
Bail in Southern California, CRIMINOLOGY CRIM. JUST. L. & SOC’Y, Aug. 2018, at 24, 34.
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require a presumption of release.212 This is because judges tend to be
extremely wary of being blamed for crimes committed by those
released pretrial; wrongful decisions to detain contain no such harmful
possibilities for the judge.213 This pressure is particularly powerful in
states such as California where judges are subject to reelection after
their initial appointment.214
Of great interest for the purposes of SB 10 is that judges, even
when presented with the possibility of relying on an actuarial risk tool
to guide discretion, tend to detain far more defendants than is
necessary to constrain dangerousness.215 In fact, most judges seem to
think that their assessments are more accurate than that of a risk
assessment tool.216 Studies suggest that, if that discretion was
removed, a larger proportion of defendants would be released while
pretrial violent crime rates would decrease.217 However, because
judges are not responsible for increased jail budgets and taxes that
come along with increased rates of pretrial detention, they have no
incentive to follow liberalized pretrial detention reforms—and, as
described above, have every incentive to over-detain.218
To summarize: judges, both in general and in California, tend to
be wary of those who tread upon their discretion, whether it be a
legislator or another judge. When legislatures enact reforms, judges

212. Wiseman, supra note 66, at 422.
213. Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy, Ripe for
Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 364 (2010) (“While it is impossible to predict who will
commit a crime while released on bail, it is easy for politicians in hindsight to criticize a judge who
granted bail to the defendant who reoffends while out on bail.”).
214. See Feeley, supra note 22, at 709 (“[M]any [judges] report that they try to transfer to civil
divisions the year before their reelection so as to avoid any unwanted attention for their bail and
sentencing decisions.”).
215. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 66, at 553–54.
216. Steven L. Chanenson & Jordan M. Hyatt, The Use of Risk Assessment at Sentencing:
Implications for Research and Policy 10 (Villanova Univ. Charles Widger Sch. of Law, Working
Paper No. 1040, 2016).
217. See id.
218. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1703
(1996) (“Because judges enjoy more independence than do legislators, they feel less pressure than
legislators to choose rules on the basis of their distributive effects.”); see also Andrew Chongseh
Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final Can Further the “Interests of
Finality”, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561, 612–13 (“Because the judiciary does not internalize the costs
of incarceration . . . judges may focus excessively on whether the defendant deserves a particular
punishment without considering whether the benefit to society of the defendant’s incarceration is
worth the financial cost of a lengthy sentence.”); Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for
Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1975 (2005) (“But . . . judges face
little if any accountability for the costs of maintaining pretrial detention facilities and prisons.”).
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tend to ignore any statutory requirements that encourage (or mandate)
liberal policies, instead either staying with practices that they are
comfortable with or making punishments more draconian, as seen in
the Alameda County courts in the late nineteenth century. Judges also
seem to be influenced by the possibility of public scorn and the
prosecutorial Sword of Damocles that is the peremptory challenge;
both of these factors tend to impel judges towards conservative
detention practices. Finally, efficiency is paramount. If a reform
threatens to clog a judge’s courtroom even worse than it already is, the
judge is likely to reject it.
B. Prosecutors
Judges are not the only powerful force within the court system.
Prosecutors hold just as much (and, in some situations, more) sway as
judges do.219 Prosecutors play an outsized role in determining an
arrestee’s release pretrial, since they have relatively unchecked
discretion to decide whether to charge an arrestee.220 Judges will
typically defer to the bail recommendation that the prosecutor makes
(even if it deviates from the schedule).221 Under the current SB 10, this
would most likely continue because there are several provisions that
allow prosecutors to file a motion requesting that an arrestee be
detained.222 Because prosecutors will continue to have such an
outsized role in determining whether an arrestee is detained pretrial, it
is as important to examine their motivations and practices as it is to
look at judges’.
As far back as the late nineteenth century, judges have tended to
make bail decisions according to prosecutorial recommendations.223
By the 1970s, not much had changed; most public officials believed
that prosecutors had a large role in determining how bail was set, with

219. See JOAN E. JACOBY & EDWARD C. RATLEDGE, THE POWER OF THE PROSECUTOR:
GATEKEEPERS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2016).
220. Id.
221. Unlocking the Black Box of Prosecution, VERA (Sept. 6, 2019, 3:00 PM),
https://www.vera.org/unlocking-the-black-box-of-prosecution/for-prosecutors.
222. See, e.g., S.B. 10 § 1320.14, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); id. § 1320.18;
id. § 1320.21.
223. FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 91, at 119–20.

(11) 53.1_PETERSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

5/20/2020 6:36 PM

SB 10 AND THE FUTURE OF BAIL IN CALIFORNIA

293

their recommendations having a strong—usually dispositive—
influence on the judge’s decision.224
As described above, prosecutors in California also can wield a
large amount of influence by using their peremptory challenge on
judges who they deem to be lenient setters of bail.225 They also can
strategically overcharge, filing charges at the highest level that the
facts will support in the anticipation that the defendant will plea down
to a lesser charge.226 In many ways, they have nearly complete control
of the initial aspects of the criminal case; it is no wonder they are
considered “the sentr[ies] at the gate of the criminal court system.”227
Prosecutorial motivations are not overly complex. Like many
judges, they are elected officials. Unlike judges, however, they are
seen as the protectors of the public interest “in an aspect of human
society that arouses people’s fear and outrage.”228 Though prosecutors
have an interest in the efficiency of the court, their other interests
outweigh it. As elected officials, they are hyper-aware of their image
in the community, and therefore they tend to “attempt to accommodate
the political demands of an electorate that tends to be vindictive
toward the malefactor.”229
Prosecutors tend to have a certain professional ethic, one that
embraces law enforcement values and requires a cultivated reputation
of “utter credibility, inevitable truth, almost of invincibility.”230 As
such, prosecutors are loath to demonstrate lenience, and often will
charge accordingly.231 Though the practice is not universal, studies
have found that many prosecutors either overcharge or ask for high
bail to ensure that a defendant will remain behind bars, since, as
discussed above, a defendant who is detained pretrial is much more
likely to plead guilty than one who is released.232 The nearly limitless
discretion granted to prosecutors means that often, whether implicitly
224. Paul B. Wice, Bail Reform in American Cities, 775 CRIM. L. BULL. (1973); see also
Frederic Suffet, Bail Setting: A Study of Courtroom Interaction, 12 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 318,
318–31 (1996) (noting prosecutorial power in the bail-setting process).
225. Supra, Part IV(A).
226. UTZ, supra note 202, at 23.
227. Id. at 20.
228. Id. at 18–19.
229. Arthur Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 70,
78 (1967).
230. Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52,
57 (1967).
231. UTZ, supra note 202, at 20.
232. BAUGHMAN, supra note 59, at 6–7.
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or explicitly, their charging decisions are tinged with racial animus. A
study of federal prosecutors recently found that they are twice as likely
to charge black men with crimes that have a minimum sentence
requirement as they are similarly situated white men, resulting in black
men facing prison sentences that are 10 percent longer than similarly
situated white men.233
In sum, prosecutors have an immense amount of power in the
criminal justice system, and the discretion to use that power as they
see fit. As described above, they tend to adhere to a professional ethic
that discourages any showing of lenience. Furthermore, as elected
officials, they typically have every incentive to keep arrestees behind
bars and secure as many guilty pleas as possible; conversely, they have
very little incentive to put people they view as dangerous back out on
the street.
C. Corrections Officers
There are other actors within the criminal justice system that
could affect SB 10’s implementation. Most important amongst these
(for our purposes) are probation officers, as probation departments
will have a significant role in implementing SB 10’s risk assessment
programs. Though risk-assessment tools are intended to remove as
much discretion as possible, that outcome depends on whether
probation officers can reliably and consistently make correct arrestee
classifications based on the tool’s recommendation. Studies on the
reliability of risk-assessment implementation are few, but one recent
study suggests that probation officers can reliably analyze the results
given to them by the risk assessment tool—alleviating concerns that
lower-level officers might misclassify whether an arrestee is low,
medium, or high risk.234
Close cases, however, will still require that a probation officer use
his discretion to classify an arrestee. Studies show that probation
officers (like other court actors) tend to err on the side of caution.235
Another study suggests that there may be racial disparities in whether
probation officers use their discretion in a manner consistent with
233. Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122
J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1344–45 (2014).
234. Patrick J. Kennedy, Are Pretrial Services Officers Reliable in Rating Pretrial Risk
Assessment Tools?, FED. PROB., June 2018, at 35, 37.
235. Mark Jones & John Kerbs, Probation and Parole Officers and Discretionary DecisionMaking: Responses to Technical and Criminal Violations, FED. PROB., June 2007, at 9.
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public interest; white officers tended to believe that they utilized their
discretion to serve public interest, whereas African-American and
female officers believed that discretionary decisions were instead
based on personal preference.236 The study also indicates that an
officer’s personal preference can be heavily influenced by social
pressures both within and outside the agency: 43 percent of officers
felt pressured to recommend incarceration or initiate formal judicial
proceedings in situations where they might otherwise not do so.237
Thus, though it seems as if probation officers can reliably implement
a risk-assessment tool, their discretionary judgment on close cases will
still err towards recommending detention.
Despite the effects probation officers could have on SB 10, the
true agents of cooption are most likely to be judges and prosecutors,
the most powerful actors within the criminal justice system. Now that
the incentives behind these institutional figures have been analyzed,
Part V will apply these lessons and examine how they have affected
the implementation of modern bail reforms.
V. CURRENT BAIL REFORMS IN OTHER STATES: HOW HAVE COURT
ACTOR MOTIVATIONS AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION?
Current bail reform efforts in other states might serve as
guideposts for the future of SB 10. New Jersey and Kentucky have
installed systems that mostly replace cash bail with risk assessment
analysis as a way of releasing more defendants pretrial—as SB 10
purports to do—so it will be enlightening to analyze how system
actors have reacted to these reforms. Have they followed the
instructions of their legislatures, presuming that defendants should be
released while detaining only the most dangerous? The answer, in
short, is no.
New Jersey passed the Criminal Justice Reform Act in 2014,
requiring that the courts replace cash bail with a pretrial risk
assessment system.238 Much like SB 10, the purpose of the reform is
to ensure that defendants did not remain behind bars solely because of
their inability to pay; detention is to be based on danger to society or
the risk that they might not reappear for trial.239 The court system is
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 12.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2019).
PDR REPORT, supra note 103, at 83.
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responsible for running the pretrial services program, as it most likely
will be in California.240 The algorithm used by the pretrial services
program is the Arnold Foundation’s Pretrial Services Assessment
(PSA), which has become the standard across the country.241 The law
went into effect in early 2017, and initial returns are promising.242 The
number of defendants sitting in jail before their trial dropped by 19
percent.243 However, the machinery that applies pressure to criminal
justice reform has already begun to work.
Soon after the implementation of this new system, a number of
people who had been arrested on gun charges were released before
trial. One man murdered someone mere days after his release, while
another killed his ex-girlfriend and himself.244 In response to the
resulting public outcry, the Judiciary Committee changed the inputs of
its risk assessment tool, making a gun charge grounds for automatic
recommendation of pretrial detention.245 Though the ACLU and New
Jersey Public Defender’s Office opposed this, arguing that the change
was an overreaction to anecdotal rather than empirical evidence, the
courts were quick to follow the recommendation.246 It is not difficult
to foresee the courts reacting to further high profile (but anecdotal)
crime committed by those released before trial, thus reversing the
positive gains made in the initial months of New Jersey’s bail law.247
In fact, other states’ experience with bail reform demonstrates that it
is foolish to read too much significance into positive short-term trends
that immediately follow reform. All too often, those trends normalize,
and the levels of pretrial detention return to the pre-reform status-quo.
Kentucky’s experience with bail reform is instructive here. In
2011, the state passed House Bill 463 (HB 463), which mandated that
240. Id. at 85.
241. Jon
Schuppe,
Post
Bail,
NBC
NEWS
(Aug. 22,
2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/bail-reform.; see also Tyler Bond, John Arnold Meddling in
California
Politics,
NAT’L
PUB.
PENSION
COALITION
(Aug. 28,
2018),
https://protectpensions.org/2018/08/28/john-arnold-meddling-california-politics/ (explaining that
John Arnold helped write the provisions of SB 10, making it likely that his company’s risk
assessment tool will be used in California).
242. PDR REPORT, supra note 103, at 85.
243. Id.
244. Schuppe, supra note 241.
245. Id.
246. Letter from Alexander Shalom, Senior Staff Att’y Gen., Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.J.,
to Judge Glenn A. Grant, Acting Admin. Dir. of N.J. Courts (Apr. 17, 2017),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3676484-ACLU-s-letter-on-bail-reform.html.
247. See Schuppe, supra note 241.
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each judge consider the determination of a risk assessment tool before
making their pretrial detention decision.248 The stated goal of the law,
similar to SB 10, is to reduce incarceration rates while allowing for
preventive detention of the dangerous.249 Like SB 10, it directed that
all low risk defendants and most medium-risk defendants (as
identified by the assessment) be released without cash bail; it also did
not order judges to follow the recommendation all the time, just to
consider it.250 The risk assessment tool used, as in New Jersey, was
the PSA.251 A study showed that, while there were promising initial
results (as in New Jersey), those results quickly normalized. Six years
after HB 463 was enacted, Kentucky’s pretrial release rates are lower
than they were before the bill and lower than the national average.252
It is believed that this has much to do with the discretion granted to
judges in Kentucky law. According to a study, judges ignored the
presumption of release and the recommendation of the tool in more
than two-thirds of all cases.253 They exercised their discretion not to
correct the risk assessment if it was wrong but to override it when it
was correct.254
This is not to say that Kentucky’s experience forecasts doom for
New Jersey, California, and other jurisdictions that attempt to make
the switch from cash bail to risk assessment systems. Though the
overall release rate decreased in Kentucky, judges did grant nonmonetary release for low-risk defendants 63 percent more than they
had before HB 463.255 Since one of the biggest injustices of the cash
bail system is that low-risk defendants remain in jail for no reason
other than that they cannot afford to get out, this represents a
248. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(2) (West 2019) (“In making [the pretrial release and bail
determination], the court shall consider the pretrial risk assessment.”).
249. Sen. Tom Jensen & Rep. John Tilley, HB 463—Statement from Sponsors, ADVOCATE
(June 2011), https://dpa.ky.gov/Public_Defender_Resources/The%20Advocate/
AdvocateJune060311FINAL4PAGE.pdf.
250. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(3) (West 2012).
251. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUNDATION, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR
PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 3 (2013), http://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/
LJAF-research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf.
252. Stevenson, supra note 80, at 309.
253. Id. at 308.
254. Kentucky is not alone in this. Judges in Cook County departed from risk assessment
recommendations 85 percent of the time. Frank Main, Cook County Judges Not Following Bail
Recommendations:
Study,
CHI.
SUN
TIMES
(July 3,
2016,
9:00
PM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/cook-county-judges-not-following-bail-recommendationsstudy-find/.
255. Stevenson, supra note 80, at 308–09.
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significant improvement.256 In addition, though many fear that risk
assessment tools will exacerbate racial disparities in pretrial detention
decisions, the study shows that, according to initial returns, racial
disparities remained the same.257 While the fact that the
implementation of risk assessment in Kentucky did not reduce racial
disparities might disappoint, it is encouraging that it did not make
things worse. Finally, the court system in Kentucky has shown itself
willing to examine the results of its system and tinker with it if
necessary.258 In light of lowered release rates, the Kentucky Supreme
Court ordered that all defendants rated low and medium risks and
charged with low-level crimes are to be automatically released on
bail—thus removing discretion from the equation.259 The order is too
recent to determine the results, but the Kentucky judiciary’s
willingness to self-evaluate and liberalize when necessary is
encouraging.
In sum, current third wave bail reform efforts show that, despite
promising initial returns, bail reform laws very similar to SB 10 have
not achieved all that reformers have hoped for. They tend to result in
a brief change in pretrial release numbers, which then normalize over
a period of years once judges begin exercising their discretion and
returning to old practices.
VI. SB 10: WHAT TO EXPECT, HOW TO FIX POTENTIAL PROBLEMS,
AND WHAT SUCCESS MIGHT LOOK LIKE
In light of all this, what can we expect of SB 10? Court actors
have already influenced the bill to grant themselves more power and
discretion.260 Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye lobbied against the original
version of the bill, arguing that it gave too much discretion to pretrial
services agencies rather than judges, that the statute tried to dictate the
factors for pretrial release when that should be the purview of judges,
and that the statute imposed too much of a burden on judges who
departed from the risk assessment recommendation.261 As seen below,
her concerns were reflected in the rewritten version of the bill.
256. Id. at 319.
257. Id. at 366.
258. Id. at 375–76.
259. Id. at 376.
260. Supra Part II(C).
261. Letter from Cory T. Jasperson, Dir. of Governmental Affairs, Judicial Council of Cal., to
Hon. Reginald B. Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair, Assembly Pub. Safety Comm. (June 30, 2017),
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The final version of SB 10 purports to set up a program much like
other risk assessment systems. The Judicial Council will promulgate
rules on how to organize the pretrial services agency and the risk
assessment tool—including how to classify “low,” “medium,” or
“high” risk arrestees.262 The local court systems are entrusted with
implementing the system.263 On the face of the bill’s text, it would
appear that nearly all “low” and “medium” risk arrestees are likely to
be released.264
However, a number of sections in the bill greatly expand judicial
discretion. Other sections enumerate many types of arrestees who may
not be released. None of these sections were present in the original
bill.
First, the statute and suggested Judicial Council Rules of Court
give wide discretion to local courts to expand the list of offenders
classified as “medium-risk,” and thus subject to detention or harsher
conditions of release.265 Though the bill warns that courts “shall not
provide for the exclusion of release of all medium-risk defendants,” it
still gives local courts nearly unfettered discretion to detain, so long as
they do not detain “all medium-risk defendants.”266 The bill also
allows wide judicial and prosecutorial discretion to detain even lowrisk defendants.267 At any time, a prosecutor may file a motion to
detain the arrestee so long as the arrestee is on any form of postconviction supervision other than probation, is subject to a pending
trial on another charge (no matter how minor), or—in a remarkably
vague provision—“there is substantial reason to believe that no . . .
condition . . . will reasonably assure protection of the public . . . or
https://keepcaliforniasafe.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/SB-10-063017.pdf
[hereinafter
Judicial Council Letter].
262. S.B. 10, § 1320.25(a), 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
263. Id. § 1320.11(a).
264. Id. § 1320.10(b)–(c) (“Pretrial Assessment Services . . . shall release a low-risk person on
his or her own recognizance” and “shall order the release or detention of medium-risk persons in
accordance with . . . standards set forth in the local rule of court.”).
265. S.B. 10, § 1320.11(a), 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (“The local rule may
further expand the list of offenses and factors for which pre-arraignment release of persons assessed
as medium risk is not permitted . . . .”).
266. Id.; see also CAL. RULES OF COURT, prop. rule 4.40(d) (“Penal Code Section 1320.10(e)
contains a comprehensive list of offenses and factors that make persons assessed as medium risk
ineligible for release by Pretrial Assessment Services; a court is not required to expand this list. If
a court chooses to add to the list of exclusionary offenses or factors, the court must not adopt a rule
that includes exclusions that effectively exclude all or nearly all persons assessed as medium risk
from pre-arraignment release.”).
267. S.B. 10, § 1320.18, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
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appearance of the defendant in court as required.”268 Once the
prosecutor files this motion, the judge may detain so long as the
reasons are stated on the record.269
SB 10, as passed in the legislature, looks remarkably similar to
the current bail reform laws analyzed above. It has the same catch-all
provision for prosecutors that New Jersey’s reform law has, allowing
prosecutors to bypass the assessment recommendation and move for
detention based on “substantial reasons” to believe that an arrestee
might flee or pose a danger.270 It mandates that judges incorporate the
recommendation of the risk assessment tool in to their decision, but
then gives discretion to ignore it, as in Kentucky’s law.271 New Jersey
courts reacted swiftly to two high-profile crimes committed by those
released on gun crimes; SB 10’s provision that allows local courts to
add, without serious limits, offenses in to the “medium-risk” category
seems to set up California courts to do the same.272
The Judicial Council’s influence on the rewritten bill sets courts
up to repeat the patterns of past and current reforms. As discussed
above, judges do not like having their traditional authority limited, be
it by legislatures, other judges, or independent agencies.273 They trust
their own judgment more than they trust algorithms.274 There can be a
tendency, whether realized or not, to mistrust arrestees, assuming that
anyone enmeshed in the criminal justice system deserves to be
there.275 Prosecutors, because of their political and ethical mandates,
will do all they can to keep arrestees behind bars.276 This is
demonstrated by historical patterns, including recent history in both
Kentucky and New Jersey.
Is there a solution? The short answer might be disappointing.
There is probably not a solution that would fully satisfy idealistic
reformers. However, this does not mean that California’s bail reform
is destined to be a failure. It merely means that reformers should work
with criminal court actors to try and implement SB 10 in a way that
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-19a(7)(a)–(b) (West 2017).
271. See S.B. 10, § 1320.18, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); see also KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 431.066(3) (West 2012).
272. S.B. 10, § 1320.11(a), 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
273. Supra, Part IV(A).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Supra, Part IV(B).
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comports as closely as possible to the law’s spirit. The best-case
scenario for criminal reformers is to focus on the “optimal, as opposed
to the maximal, solution.”277 This means bridging the ideological
divide and compromising with those who might oppose the reformers’
views. Despite decrying the rewritten (and ultimately passed) version
of SB 10, the ACLU pledged to continue working with the bill’s
sponsor, Senator Hertzberg, to work towards truly liberalized pretrial
detention that also reduces racial biases. What might that legislation
look like?
Several scholars have suggested that the only way a risk
assessment-based system will truly work is if judicial discretion is
severely limited. The study of the Kentucky pretrial system posited
that, in light of how quickly Kentucky judges used their discretion to
ignore the risk assessment’s recommendations, a risk assessment
system would not work as intended unless the legislature severely
restricted a judge’s ability to depart from the recommendation.278
Another scholar recommends that, in order to optimize the liberalizing
effects of a risk assessment system, subjective discretion should be
minimal.279 Yet another goes a step further, saying that judges should
be subject to mandatory bail guidelines.280
The opposing viewpoint is that, as described below, risk
assessment algorithms are far from perfect. In fact, if the algorithms
are built with historical data (as they inevitably must be), they will be
inherently biased against groups that have been over-incarcerated;
primarily, minorities and the poor.281 By allowing judges to retain
most of their discretion, arrestees who may have fallen victim to a
faulty risk analysis could be saved from detention by a lenient judge.
Either way, arguments for limiting judicial discretion are almost
certainly moot; it is simply unrealistic to expect that the Judicial
Council—or local judges—would accept such a restraint on their
discretion. Indeed, the original draft of SB 10 recommended very
limited controls on discretion (such as requiring judges to make
written reports as to why they had departed from the risk assessment
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Pillsbury, supra note 156, at 776.
See Stevenson, supra note 80, at 373–74.
BAUGHMAN, supra note 59, at 70.
Wiseman, supra note 66, at 462.
Jennifer L. Doleac & Megan Stevenson, Are Criminal Risk Assessment Scores Racist?,
BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/08/22/arecriminal-risk-assessment-scores-racist/.
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recommendation) which were resoundingly shot down by the Judicial
Council.282 Even if they had not, the history examined in this Note
points to legislative controls over the judiciary not having very much
practical effect; court actors would find a loophole to exploit.
With legislative controls over the judiciary out of the picture,
perhaps the legislature could restrict prosecutorial power? For the
same reasons described above, it is unlikely that the legislature would
walk back SB 10’s provision allowing prosecutors to file a motion for
pretrial detention at will. However, perhaps reformers could
encourage the legislature to look to New Jersey as inspiration for a
different type of prosecutorial control; in order to better control
sentencing in drug cases, the New Jersey Attorney General instituted
the Brimage guidelines.283 In short, the guidelines provide a range of
sentences a prosecutor can offer during the plea process, prompting
her to pick a specific offense to charge, how many offenses to charge,
and how many prior crimes to invoke.284 This prevents a prosecutor
from threatening an arrestee with the mandatory maximum as
leverage.285 Without this negotiating tool, perhaps prosecutors might
be more reasonable in their charging patterns. Because one of the
weightier factors in the risk assessment tool is the severity of the
charged crime, this might result in fewer arrestees detained pretrial.
New Jersey instituted the Brimage guidelines, however, in
response to a ruling by the New Jersey Supreme Court.286 Considering
how politically driven and crime-control oriented prosecutors are, it
seems doubtful that they would allow the legislature, as opposed to a
court, to introduce this kind of discretionary control without a pitched
battle. And seeing how the interests of court actors were able to so
substantially influence the ultimate version of SB 10, it is eminently
possible that they would win this battle as well.
So where does that leave California’s current iteration of bail
reform? It seems the likeliest avenues for compromise and success are
two-fold. One is for reform-minded legislators to shift their focus to
282. Judicial Council Letter, supra note 261, at 3.
283. Revised Attorney General Guidelines for Negotiating Cases under N.J.S.A. —Effective for
Offenses Committed on or After September 15, 2004, OFF. ATT’Y GEN., ST. N.J.,
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/directives/brimagerevision.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
284. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 148–50 (2017).
285. See id. at 149.
286. See State v. Brimage, 706 A.2d 1096 (N.J. 1998).
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the risk assessment tool itself. Many scholars worry that risk
assessment tools will exacerbate race-based detention disparities,
since the data used to generate recommendations will necessarily be
old data, tainted by the systemic racism baked into the criminal justice
system.287 Worse, risk assessment tools tend to operate as a black box,
with those subject to their recommendations unable to understand why
the tool recommended as it did.288 A recent case in Wisconsin, where
a plaintiff made a due process challenge to the state’s risk assessment
tool, highlighted the problem.289 Though the court rejected the due
process claim, a concurrence stated: “[T]his court’s lack of
understanding of [the risk assessment tool] was a significant problem
in the instant case. At oral argument, the court repeatedly questioned
both the State’s and defendant’s counsel about how [the tool] works.
Few answers were available.”290
Reformers in California should work to ensure that the risk
assessment tool used does not operate as a black box that worsens preexisting racial disparities. The ACLU has already committed itself to
this task.291 To succeed, it should ensure that, whichever risk
assessment tool the Judicial Council opts to use, the public and press
have the ability to analyze the tool for biased decision-making and
problematic algorithms. Reformers should keep a close watch on this
information and monitor it for warning signs. If the data shows that
the risk assessment tool is failing to improve race-based detention
disparities, reformers should work with the tool’s designers to remedy
the problem. In that way, reformers could ensure that the tool, at the
very least, is not making recommendations that will exacerbate the
problems that money bail caused. Encouragingly, a bill sponsored by
Senator Hertzberg that establishes “guidelines for data collection,
transparency requirements, and regular validation of the tools” passed
in the California Senate on April 25, 2019.
287. See generally Koepke & Robinson, supra note 35 (describing in detail how bail algorithms
could worsen, rather than improve, racial disparities).
288. See Kelly Hannah-Moffatt, Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled” Proposition, 30 JUST.
Q. 270 (2013) (discussing transparency concerns with risk assessment); Melissa Hamilton, RiskNeeds Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 267–71
(2015) (discussing legal issues related to transparency in risk assessment).
289. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
290. Id. at 774 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
291. ACLU of California Statement: Governor Brown Signs Bail Reform Legislation Opposed
by ACLU, supra note 143 (“We will work with lawmakers and our community partners” to “ensure
a significant reduction in incarceration and also provide due process and promote racial justice.”).
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A second reasonable expectation for success would be to follow
in Kentucky’s footsteps. Although, as described above, the bail reform
experiment there has not been everything that idealists could have
hoped for, there are signs that it has been a moderate success. First,
there has been a 63 percent increase in the release of low-level
offenders since the enactment of Kentucky’s bail reform law.292
Second, there is evidence that the risk assessment tool did not
exacerbate racial disparities (though it did not improve them either).293
Finally, the most important lesson to take from Kentucky’s experience
is that the state is taking steps to slowly but surely improve on the
system. Studies of criminal justice reform explain that “failing to
engage in self-reflection” is the number one mistake that reformers
make, and that criminal justice officials “should constantly ask
themselves what’s working, what isn’t, and why.”294 Kentucky seems
to be constantly evaluating the success of its own reform efforts,
something that happens all too rarely in criminal reform.295 The fact
that the Kentucky Supreme Court observed that pretrial release rates
were too low post-reform, acknowledged this was a problem, and
promulgated rules to try and fix the problem is encouraging.
SB 10 currently has a provision that provides for the Judicial
Council to make reports to the California governor every year starting
in 2021.296 Ensuring that this provision remains in the bill and is
faithfully followed would be a good first step on the path to success.
Reformers should also make sure to pressure the necessary actors so
that the Judicial Council reacts appropriately to the data they receive,
as the Kentucky Supreme Court did. If the Judicial Council and the
legislature (with the help of activist reformers) continually monitor the
new pretrial release program and revise it as necessary, SB 10 may
well work to slowly improve California’s pretrial detention system.
Since Senator Hertzberg is working with the ACLU to ensure that the
law is implemented justly, perhaps reformers could encourage him and
his colleagues to create a checklist of goals to be met; reduction in
detention rate for low-level criminals, reduction of racial disparities in
pretrial detention, and transparency in implementation would be a
292. Supra Part V.
293. Id.
294. BERMAN & FOX, supra note 155, at 115–16.
295. Supra Part V (Kentucky Supreme Court, upon discovering that its pretrial release rates
were too low following reform, implemented new rules to try to fix the problem).
296. S.B. 10 § 1320.24, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
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good start. Such a checklist would allow reformers a tangible way of
ensuring that both legislators and the Judicial Council fulfill their end
of the bail reform bargain—and an easy way to hold them accountable
to the public if they do not.
Based on past patterns, it is clear that the idealists who push for
bail reform are not going to get everything they wanted out of SB 10.
In fact, if there is one thing reformers should not do, it is to press too
hard for overly liberalized pretrial release, even if SB 10 is overturned
by referendum in 2020. As discussed above, this type of aggressive
reform will always be faced with vehement opposition from those who
value order and safety, as well as from actors within the court systems.
At best, such reforms would never be fully implemented (if they ever
get implemented). At worst, they might result in a backlash that makes
things worse than they are now—as demonstrated by the fact that
pretrial detention rates skyrocketed a mere twenty years after the
liberal bail reforms of the 1960s thanks to the war on crime.
With an eye towards compromising with institutional actors and
those who seek to increase order in society, however, small steps can
be taken towards progress. Transparency, self-evaluation, reduction in
detention rates for low-level criminals (particularly those who would
otherwise be stuck in jail due to inability to post bail), and a system
that does not exacerbate racial disparities—while these are not the fixall, utopian goals envisioned by pretrial detention reformers—are
good, reasonable targets to work toward.
VII. CONCLUSION
History shows that when idealists expect too much of criminal
justice reform, they are disappointed over and over again. This is in
large part due to a failure to understand that actors within the court
system have little incentive to implement liberalizing reforms, and
every incentive to keep things the way they are. This does not mean
that SB 10 is destined to fail; it just means that reformers should have
reasonable expectations for its success. The problems created by
judicial or prosecutorial discretion are unlikely to be eliminated. But,
if reformers focus on ensuring that both the risk assessment tool and
the court’s methodologies are transparent, as well as making sure that
the Judicial Council self-evaluates and promises to improve on
failures, SB 10 could represent the first steps toward a fairer pretrial
system.
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